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A Comment on R. v. Reeves:
Investigative Issues with Shared
Electronic Devices and Data
Mabel Lai*

I. OVERVIEW
Digital privacy is the shared intellectual playground of the legal and
technological cognoscenti. Although our legal traditions have been slow to
adapt to our technological reality,1 they are adapting — and the
imperatives of modern policing must adapt in tandem. That need is keenly
felt in respect of the Supreme Court of Canada’s adaptation, in R. v.
Reeves,2 of our traditional concepts of ownership and privacy to the arena
of shared electronic devices and data.
It is an old problem applied to a new context: when the courts speak,
the police must react. Immediately. As every responsible police service is
aware, complacency in the face of legal developments can have dire
consequences for ongoing investigations.3 But concrete guidance is not
*

Crown Counsel, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), Crown Law Office —
Criminal. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not of her employer.
1
See S. Magotiaux, “Out of Sync: Section 8 and Technological Advancement in Supreme
Court Jurisprudence” (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501-515; G. Chan, “Text Messaging: The Most
Private (And Recorded) Form of Communication”, The Advocates’ Journal (2018) 36 Adv. J. No. 4
26-29.
2
[2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.).
3
See, for example, the dissenting reasons in R. v. G.T.D., [2014] A.J. No. 879, 2017
ABCA 274, at para. 90 (Alta. C.A.), rev’d [2018] S.C.J. No. 7, 2018 SCC 7, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 200
(S.C.C.):
Relying on a precedent with deep roots in Canadian law is understandable, but police
services have an ongoing obligation to consider whether their practices have kept pace with
developments in Charter jurisprudence. Changes in the law may require the police to
re-evaluate their historic practices. Rather than waiting for a binding appellate decision that
specifically approves or disapproves of a policy or procedure, police services should
consider how courts are likely to apply settled Charter principles, and reasonably anticipate
how broad statements of law might require changes to their traditional practices. It
is particularly important for the police to respond to developments in the law when a
practice — like a standard police caution - may affect many individuals’ Charter rights.
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always available in the fraught and fledgling area of digital privacy. Like
the technologies underlying the debate, the law is a logic-driven exercise
beleaguered by an inherent uncertainty in its application. The normative
approach to defining reasonable expectations of privacy is fundamentally
aspirational and therefore laden with value judgments that enhance
predictive uncertainty.4 And unlike the jurists, counsel and academics
who have devoted energies to unpacking the potential applications of
section 8 Charter jurisprudence to our technological reality, criminal
investigators will not usually have the luxury of contemplative reflection
and protracted debate before deciding on a course of action.
The past decade’s worth of section 8 Charter litigation demonstrates
the manner in which competing views on digital privacy can be
reasonably held and powerfully defended, sometimes for years, until the
question is resolved in the Supreme Court of Canada.5 The resulting flux
in the legal landscape is inevitable, and on balance, desirable. There is
much to commend the appellate process as a mode of jurisprudential
development. However, the attendant uncertainty has significant
implications for the day-to-day conduct of criminal investigations.
This article considers some of those implications. The first section explores
the baseline from which post-Reeves investigative action must begin. The
second section considers two questions explicitly left open in R. v. Reeves. The
third section posits additional scenarios in which R. v. Reeves will impact
the investigation of technology-assisted or technology-targeted crime.

II. LESSONS
1. The Background
The factual simplicity of Reeves belies its legal complexity. Mr. Reeves
was charged with assaulting his common-law spouse, Ms. G. A court order
Of course, the police are not allowed to simply choose the least onerous path through a
constitutional gray area: R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3
S.C.R. 621, at para. 94 (S.C.C.).
4
For a succinct explanation of the normative approach, see S. Coughlan, “Grappling with
Normative Notions of Privacy: R. v. Mills” (2019) 54 C.R. (7th) 61.
5
If we start the clock from R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253
(S.C.C.), establishing, in the context of a carelessly drafted, misleading and incomplete Information
to Obtain a search warrant, that “it is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than
the search of one’s home and personal computer” (paras. 105-106), the examination of which can
reveal “the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic peregrinations” (para. 3).
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prohibited him from being in the family home without Ms. G’s written
revocable consent. Ms. G initially provided that consent. She revoked it in a
phone call to Mr. Reeves’ probation officer. She expressed safety concerns.
She wanted to leave the relationship. She and her sister, who had lived in the
home for a period, had found approximately 30 movies of child pornography
on the family computer. Her sister confirmed to the probation officer that
one of the videos was entitled “11 and 12 year-old doing daddy”. Ms. G and
Mr. Reeves’s teenage daughters lived in the family home.
Mr. Reeves was in bail court when the contraband came to light. The
probation officer told Ms. G not to move the computer, and that she
would call the police. Ms. G did not object. The probation officer called
the local Crown Attorney’s office and the police. A police officer
attended the home. Ms. G invited him inside. Ms. G and her sister told
the officer that Mr. Reeves had recently tried to wipe the computer clean.
Ms. G signed a written consent to allow the officer to seize the
computer.6 The officer waited for Ms. G to bring him the computer. He
did not search the home. He did not turn on the computer. He did not
inspect any of the data on the computer. He seized the computer pending
a search warrant to re-seize it from property and to examine its contents.
He inadvertently failed to file a Report to Justice pursuant to section
489.1 of the Criminal Code7 until after that search warrant was issued,
about four months later. The authorized examination revealed 140 images
and 22 videos of child pornography, and a Bit Torrent file with video
titles suggestive of pre-pubescent incest.
2. The Procedural History
The trial judge held that Ms. G could neither consent to the officer
entering the family home, nor to the officer seizing the family computer. In
his view, R. v. Cole required that the officer obtain the consent of every
person who had a privacy interest in the home and computer.8 The trial
judge found Mr. Reeves’s section 8 Charter rights were infringed by this
conduct, as well as by deficiencies in the search warrant and the delayed

6

There was a factual dispute about the validity of this consent. At trial, Ms. G. testified
that she did not think she had a choice whether to sign the form: R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56,
2018 SCC 56, at para. 46 (S.C.C.).
7
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
8
Interestingly, the trial judge also presided over the trial in R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J.
No. 53, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (S.C.C.).
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filing of the report to justice. He made strong findings about the nature of
the police conduct. He excluded the child pornography under section 24(2).
The Crown appealed against the acquittal. A unanimous Court of
Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, holding that Ms. G had the
authority to consent to the officer’s entry into the family home and to the
seizure of the family computer. They relied on a multitude of factors that
established that Ms. G and Mr. Reeves had equal and overlapping
privacy interests in the home, where they lived with their teenage
daughters, and in the family computer, which had a “general password
that is just open so that anybody can use it” and was regularly used by
any member of the family.9 Although the deficiencies in the search
warrant gave rise to a section 8 Charter breach, the child pornography
should not have been excluded under section 24(2).
3. The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
Mr. Reeves successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, with leave,
from the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court
allowed the appeal, excluded the evidence, and restored the acquittal.
The result was unanimous. The reasoning was not. Writing for the
majority, Karakatsanis J. expressly declined to address whether the entry
into the family home was lawful.10 On the “assumption” that the entry
was lawful, “third party consent” could not authorize the seizure of the
shared device. A user of that device maintains a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the device that cannot be nullified or waived by another
user who shares control. Ms. G’s consent was therefore insufficient
authority for the warrantless seizure of Mr. Reeves’s computer.11 There
was no other source of authority available to the officer, who did not
believe that he had reasonable grounds to effect that seizure. The
majority also declined to resolve whether section 8 of the Charter is
9
R. v. Reeves, [2017] O.J. No. 3038, 2017 ONCA 365 (Ont. C.A.) [Reeves (OCA)]. The
relevance of Mr. Reeves’s court-ordered inability to access the family home and computer to his
reasonable expectation of privacy was the subject of reasoned debate at all levels of court. There is a
self-evident incongruency in relying on state-compelled conduct or a state-generated state of affairs
as a basis for undermining an expectation of privacy that would otherwise have availed: see, for
example, R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 38 (S.C.C.), citing R. v.
Marakah, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 130 (S.C.C.).
10
At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for Mr. Reeves did not challenge the entry to the
home, and counsel for the Crown conceded the deficiencies in the search warrant: R. v. Reeves,
[2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 15, 72-75 (S.C.C.).
11
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 20-26, 62 (S.C.C.).
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engaged if an individual voluntarily brings or offers an item to the police
(as opposed to the police taking it from the individual on consent).
In his concurring opinion, Moldaver J. was of the view that the Court
should address the legality of the police entry into the family home.12 He
posited the ancillary powers doctrine as “a possible alternate” basis for
lawful entry into the family home, and provided five tentative criteria for
a common law power to enter a shared residence to take a statement.13
In separate concurring reasons, Côté J. opined that a co-habitant could
consent to police entry into the common areas of the family home. She
accepted that the police had a common law power to enter a shared
residence to take a statement, but would have further held that individuals
with overlapping privacy interests and rights in a common space can
permit entry by a third party, police or otherwise. In so doing, the cohabitant was waiving their own right — no one else’s. Justice Côté would
have also affirmed the lawfulness of the police seizure of the family
computer. Mr. Reeves’s expectation of privacy was attenuated by the
realities of joint ownership and joint use, such that Ms. G could consent to
a seizure of the physical device — albeit not the data that resided on it.
4. The Takeaways
Despite the parties’ mixed success in the courts below, the majority of
the Supreme Court held that the police should have known that Ms. G’s
consent was insufficient authority for the seizure of the family
computer.14 That point was arguable before the decision; it is not now.
Indeed, three propositions appear beyond dispute after R. v. Reeves. First, the
police cannot seize a shared electronic device based on the consent of a

12
It is interesting that the majority did not share this view, given the highly contextual and
fact-specific inquiry into the existence of an expectation of privacy for the purposes of s. 8 of the
Charter, and the important role that the nature and extent of that expectation plays in the analysis
under s. 24(2) of the Charter. It may be that the impact on the Charter-protected informational
interest was so great that, as a practical matter, the territorial interest had no role left to play.
13
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 71-99 (S.C.C.). The criteria
are summarized at para. 96.
14
This reasoning is reminiscent of how “genuine ambiguity” for the purposes of statutory
interpretation does not arise from the existence of more than one possible interpretation, or because
lower courts or doctrinal writers have come to different conclusions: R. v. Bell ExpressVu Limited
Partnership, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 30 (S.C.C.); Canadian Oxy Chemicals
Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 87, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, at para. 14 (S.C.C.);
Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 12-18.
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proper subset of its users.15 Second, the police cannot examine the data on a
shared electronic device based on the consent of a proper subset of its users.
Third, the police cannot ask a user of a shared electronic device to show them
the data on it, or conduct themselves in a manner that is tantamount to asking.
Although the consent of a proper subset of users is insufficient
authority to seize a shared device, the police may still rely on other
sources of lawful authority, such as the plain view doctrine, exigent
circumstances, search incident to arrest, or the ancillary powers doctrine.
Recall that the officer in Reeves did not subjectively believe that a child
pornography offence had been committed and that the shared device
would afford evidence of that offence, although he had a clear objective
basis for that belief. On a different record, sources of authority apart
from consent would have been ripe for consideration.
A less dramatic but equally important takeaway is the constitutional
importance of section 489.1 of the Criminal Code. In her concurrence,
Côté J. emphasized the importance of the reporting requirement as a
gateway to the statutory protections conferred on persons whose things
have been seized.16 Law enforcement in Ontario were put on notice about
this issue almost four years ago in R. v. Garcia-Machado.17 Law
enforcement across the country now must also take heed.

III. TWO OPEN QUESTIONS
1. Entry into a Shared Home to Seize a Thing
The Court explicitly diverged on two questions. The first question
was if and when a co-habitant could consent to police entry into a shared
home to seize an electronic device.
Section 487 of the Criminal Code contemplates authority to search a
place, for a thing — and then the seizure of the thing, from that place.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal decision in R. v. Vu, addressing
the requirements of a computer search warrant, put to bed any dispute
about the privacy interests implicated by the examination of data on an
electronic device, and the need to write to those interests in the search

15
A proper subset is a subset that is strictly contained in the set, and therefore necessarily
excludes at least one member of that set.
16
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 134 (S.C.C.).
17
[2015] O.J. No. 4146, 2015 ONCA 569, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).
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warrant application.18 But R. v. Vu also escalated an ongoing debate about
whether an electronic device is the “place” to be searched or the “thing”
to be seized, for the purposes of section 487 of the Criminal Code.19 The
current approach in Ontario is to describe the physical location from
which the device will be seized as the “place”, and to describe the device
as the “thing” to be seized from that place. Terms and conditions are
included in the search warrant to circumscribe the examination of the
data contained in or available to the device, and to ensure that the overall
search is no more intrusive than is reasonably necessary.20 In short —
and despite the frequent use of the phrase — one does not truly “search”
a computer. One searches a physical location for the computer, seizes the
computer, and then examines the data contained in or available to the
computer, subject to certain limiting terms and conditions.
The distinction between the search of the “place”, the seizure of the
“thing”, and the examination of the data on or available to the “thing” is
important. For example, places can only be entered, and things can only
be seized, during the timeframe of execution identified in the search
warrant. But things can be examined at any time subsequent to their
seizure — and with an electronic device, the examination of the data
contained on or available to it is the kernel of the privacy complaint.
Each of these investigative stages has its own implications for privacy
and for the section 8 Charter analysis. The analysis in R. v. Morelli is an
example of those distinct stages translating into distinct features of the
impugned act: the constitutional wrong was that the police searched a
home (place), seized a personal computer from it (thing), and then
examined the data contained on it “without supervision or constraint” —
all without lawful authority.21
In contrast, the majority in Reeves did not find it necessary to address
whether the police were lawfully in the shared living room (place). The
analysis in Reeves characterizes the constitutional wrong compendiously:
that the police seized a home computer without lawful authority. Whether
the territorial privacy interest in the shared living room was infused into
18

R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.).
Or its analogues. The court in Vu compared a computer to other “places” (quotation
marks in original).
20
See, for example, the manner of execution discussion in R. v. John, [2018] O.J. No. 4495,
2018 ONCA 702, at paras. 16-26 (Ont. C.A.). Section 487(2.1)(a) of the Criminal Code addresses
data contained in or available to the computer system.
21
R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.). Deficiencies in the
drafting of the Information to Obtain resulted in the quashing of the search warrant for Mr. Morelli’s
home and the seizure and examination of his computer.
19
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or subsumed by the informational interest in the data residing on or
available to the computer is unclear. However, Reeves should not be
taken as depriving future courts of the ability to fully consider the
manner, including the location or the specific device, from which the
thing was seized or the data was accessed or examined.22 For example,
“Does X have a privacy interest in her banking information” is a question
wrongly asked, because it lacks section 8 Charter meaning without
additional context. It is one thing if the banking information is accessed
through an electronic copy posted to her public Instagram profile,
another if it is accessed through an electronic copy stored on the servers
at her bank, and quite another if it is accessed through an electronic copy
stored on the computer in her bedroom.
Further, the majority in Reeves does not provide separate roles for the
seizure of the “thing” (for which the police relied on consent), and the
examination of the data contained on that “thing” (for which the police
did not rely on consent, and obtained a search warrant). Privacy is
contextual; the location from which the device was seized, and the
precise nature of the privacy intrusion engaged by the seizure, should be
given distinct and full consideration. As Côté J. pointed out in her
concurring reasons, it is important to be precise about the privacy
interests that are implicated by a seizure of a computer as opposed to an
examination of its contents.23 The informational privacy interests at the
forefront of the majority’s analysis are engaged by the data, and either
not at all or to a lesser degree by the device itself. Consider if the
computer in Reeves only had evidentiary value as a physical object (e.g.,
as property obtained by crime, or as a substrate for fingerprints or DNA).
A proper analysis would account for the reason for which the police
actually sought the computer — as an object, or as a data storage
medium — and how the police actually acted in relation to that
computer. The majority decision in Reeves should not be taken as
preventing the police, in an appropriate case, from taking custody of an
electronic device (i.e., acting on it as an object), pending a search warrant

22
Consider, for example, the question left open in R. v. Marakah, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59,
2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608 (S.C.C.) about the place of the search — whether it was the
device through which the messages were accessed or stored, or in a “metaphorical chat room”.
While the manner of access may not have been relevant to resolve the question of standing, it should
remain relevant to the resolution of any substantive section 8 Charter inquiry.
23
Further to the terminological debate described earlier, Côté J. writes of “a search of its
contents” (emphasis in original) (para. 106).
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to permit the examination of its data (i.e., acting on it as a data storage
medium).24
This shift in the Court’s analytical lens — through which it was not
necessary to give effect to the territorial interests or the distinction
between the seizure of the device and the examination of the data
contained on it — underscores the increasing importance of
informational privacy in the section 8 Charter landscape.25 In the end
result, there remains a persuasive line of authority that the police may
enter and examine a common area of a shared home, based on the
consent of a co-habitant. Entry into and seizures from the common area
of the family home could engage different considerations than entering
and seizing that same item from a bedroom or other private area of that
same home.26 However, venturing any further into the home entails a
significant litigation risk.27
2. Voluntary Surrender of a Thing to the Police
The second question is if and when a voluntary surrender of an
electronic device to the police engages section 8 of the Charter. The
distinction between a surrender and a solicited but valid consent is
unclear.
In dismissing the Crown’s policy argument that accepting Mr. Reeves’s
position would prevent victims of harassing or threatening text messages
24
The majority explicitly contemplates relying on the doctrine of exigent circumstances as
authority for preservation. It may be that less onerous requirements may suffice. Consider the line of
authority in Ontario holding that mere sealing of hospital blood samples, pending a search warrant,
is not an unreasonable seizure: R. v. LaChappelle, [2007] O.J. No. 3613, 2007 ONCA 655, at paras.
29, 41 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2007] S.C.C.A. 584; R. v. Gettins, [2003] O.J.
No. 4758, 181 C.C.C. (3d) 304 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. O’Brien, [2007] O.J. No. 771, 2007 ONCA 138
(Ont. C.A.).
25
See R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43, at paras. 34-51
(S.C.C.), in which Cromwell J. provides guidance on the conceptual framework and content of
informational privacy.
26
As a practical matter, reliance on consent as authority for the seizure of an electronic
device poses challenges, such as the high standard to demonstrate waiver, the difficulty in precisely
articulating the scope of an anticipated examination of the data residing on or available to the device,
and the right of the claimant to revoke their consent at any time. Consider, for example, the potential
issues arising from the examination of a sexual assault complainant’s electronic device, and the
possibility that the data therein could constitute a “record” for the purposes of the third party records
regime in ss. 278.92-94 of the Criminal Code.
27
Rather than reproduce it in this paper, please see the detailed discussion and cases cited
by the Crown in its Respondent Factum before the Supreme Court at pp. 9-26: online:
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/37676/FM020_Respondent_Her-Majestythe-Queen.pdf>.
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from showing those messages to the police, the majority noted that “the
issue of whether s. 8 of the Charter is engaged when a private citizen
offers information or an item to the police in which another person may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy does not arise in this case”, and
contemplates a different result had Ms. G voluntarily brought the
computer to the police.28
As Côté J. observed, the result risks “an unworkable doctrine whereby
a joint owner/user of an object could voluntarily give the object to the
police but could not consent to an affirmative request to seize it.
Delineating the boundaries of such a distinction would be a difficult task;
and in any event, it would amount to a distinction without a difference.”29
The majority’s concern is with the co-user’s information — and with it
falling into state hands without his consent. If another citizen turns the
shared device over to the state, the interference with the co-user’s
informational interests is no different, and the co-user’s “loss of control
over the subject matter” is no more voluntary than was Mr. Reeves’s
when Ms. G. revoked consent and the court order operated to separate
him from the shared device.
Further, the majority’s reasoning contemplates a witness being
permitted to describe, but not show, data on a shared device to the police,
with the description forming the grounds for lawful authority to examine
that data.30 A simple hypothetical demonstrates the practical challenges
in giving effect to this distinction. Consider a complainant who brings a
shared tablet to the police station. She wants to report child sex abuse
material on that tablet. She tries to show the police a video. The police
stop her. Pursuant to R. v. Reeves, they say they cannot look at the screen,
but they can hear her description of what is on it. Can the complainant
watch the video or refresh her memory from it from time-to-time as
needed — or is that the functional equivalent of the police looking at it
themselves? Can the police ask clarifying questions, and if so, is the
complainant entitled to manipulate the device in order to answer those
questions? Is there a difference if the complainant came to the police
station with hard-copy screen-captures of what she observed? What if the
complainant is a young person or has a unique vulnerability, such as
particular mental illnesses or communication disorders?31 Is there a
28

R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 46 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 129 (S.C.C.).
30
R. v. Marakah, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 50
(S.C.C.) (“will typically permit the police to obtain a warrant”).
31
Id., at para. 183.
29
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threshold at which the police are entitled or obliged to look at the video,
to satisfy themselves of the reliability of the complainant’s report — and
would that action be curable by disclosure in the Information to Obtain
(e.g., as information known but not relied upon)? What if the
complainant does not want to look at or describe the video in words?
What if the complainant is the victim of the activity — is it a
constitutional imperative that she describe the video of herself to the
police, though it may further enhance the risk of re-victimization
inherent in the investigation and prosecution of offences of that nature?
A partial solution avails if Reeves is strictly confined to the situation
that all three opinions sought to address: the shared device. The majority
decision in Reeves should not be taken to apply to solely-used devices —
as will hopefully be the case in most child exploitation, sexual violence
or intimate-partner violence investigations. Neither should the majority
decision in Reeves be taken as resolving the policy concerns raised by
Moldaver J. in his dissent in Marakah about a complainant’s ability to
consent to the police accessing a text message conversation through his
solely-used device. Marakah established that Mr. Marakah had standing
to challenge the admissibility of his electronic conversation with
Mr. Winchester, though it was accessed through Mr. Winchester’s device.
Reeves is silent on whether Mr. Winchester’s consent would have been
sufficient authority for the police to view that electronic conversation, if
it was accessed through Mr. Winchester’s device. The proper interaction
of Marakah and Reeves is not yet settled, and the current state of the law
provides no reason to adopt a categorical approach for solely-used
devices — particularly where the text messages are themselves the actus
reus of an offence (e.g., luring, threatening, criminal harassment), or
where the relationship is readily demonstrated to fall outside the scope of
section 8 Charter protection.32

IV. WHAT THE FUTURE MAY HOLD
Questions remain about the contours of legitimate investigative
conduct with respect to shared devices, and will continue to arise as the
jurisprudence develops around informational privacy in the context of
technology-assisted crime.
The Court will have to grapple with what constitutes a “shared
device” or “shared data” — from banal technologies like a shared
32

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at paras. 24-26 (S.C.C.).
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voicemail account, to shared private spaces like an online portal for a
joint bank account, to shared public spaces abstracted from identifiable
devices or parties like a hacking forum on the dark web.33 The use of
online or other electronic undercover techniques also raises the question
whether an electronic communication can be characterized as a “shared
space” (or metaphorical chat room, to borrow the phraseology from
Marakah), and whether the consent of one party is sufficient authority
for its examination by law enforcement.34 Recent decisions — R. v.
Mills,35 R. v. Bearisto,36 and R. c. Blais37 — suggest that the holding in
Reeves may have limited applications to these undercover scenarios.
The impact on R. v. Reeves in the context of technology-targeted
crime is also a live issue. Sophisticated cybercrime attacks (e.g., DDOS,
hacking, ransomware, malware) will target infrastructure, large-scale
commercial operations, financial and educational institutions, and
governmental operations.38 The targeted technology will necessarily
implicate the private data of hundreds of thousands, if not more, of
individuals who may or may not reside in Canada. It will not be feasible
for the police to identify, much less obtain consent, from all those
individuals. Recall that the majority in R. v. Reeves would have required
a search warrant to simply seize the device, before any examination of
the data on it. Corporations and institutions will not wait for a search
warrant to seize or lock down their servers; they will take immediate
action to rectify any data breach and mitigate the financial and public
relations impact, even if that contaminates the forensic trail. It remains to
be seen whether law enforcement can have recourse to institutional or
corporate consent, exigent circumstances, plain view, the ancillary
powers doctrine, or some other source of warrantless authority to
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forensically image, seize or otherwise preserve the targeted technology
for investigation.
It is difficult to predict the emergence of new technologies, let alone
the role they will play in our daily lives. It is no easier to predict how the
law will adapt to meet those technological developments. The only
certainty is that the legitimate dictates of public safety and constitutional
norms will continue to interact with each other in a complicated dance
through the jurisprudence, for many years to come.

